Caauwe v. Caauwe : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Caauwe v. Caauwe : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ellen Maycock; Kruse, Landa & Maycock; attorneys for appellant.
Robert L. Neeley; attorney for appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Caauwe v. Caauwe, No. 930471 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5720
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS T2WI-6A 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
DARYL GENE CAAUWE, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 
DEBRA KAY CAAUWE, 
Plaintiff and Appellee. 
Case No. 93 G703705 @A 
Priority No. 1 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DARYL GENE CAAUWE 
Appeal from Findings of Fact and Order on 
Plaintiffs Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce 
Entered by the Second Judicial District Court 
for Davis County, State of Utah 
Honorable W. Brent West 
District Judge 
ROBERT L. NEELEY (2373) 
Attorney for Appellee 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)621-3646 
ELLEN MAYCOCK (2131) 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorneys for Appellant 
50 West 300 South, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
DARYL GENE CAAUWE, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 
DEBRA KAY CAAUWE, 
Plaintiff and Appellee. 
Case No. 92-6703705-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DARYL GENE CAAUWE 
Appeal from Findings of Fact and Order on 
Plaintiffs Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce 
Entered by the Second Judicial District Court 
for Davis County, State of Utah 
Honorable W. Brent West 
District Judge 
ROBERT L. NEELEY (2373) 
Attorney for Appellee 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)621-3646 
ELLEN MAYCOCK (2131) 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorneys for Appellant 
50 West 300 South, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 
I. FEDERAL LAW PRECLUDES A STATE COURT 
FROM TREATING VSI PAYMENTS AS MARITAL 
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DIVISION 5 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE SOUTH 
CAROLINA DECREE OF DIVORCE 9 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DARYL HAS 
THE ABILITY TO PAY DEBRA'S ATTORNEY'S FEES 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 10 
CONCLUSION 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 12 
ADDENDUM INDEX 13 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992) 10 
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) 9 
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) 5 
Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak, 111 Cal. Rptr. 664 (Cal App. 1986) 6 
Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) 4, 6,10 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796P.2d403 (Utah App. 1990) 1,2 
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) 4, 5, 10 
Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) 2 
Van Der Stappen v. Van Der Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah App. 1991) 9 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656P.2d431 (Utah 1982) 9 
10 U.S.C. § 1174 6, 7, 8 
10U.S.C. § 1175 1,3,4,7,8,10 
10 U.S.C. § 1408 3, 4, 6, 10 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-l 9 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(i) 1 
Secondary Authority 
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-311, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1112 7 
ii 
IN THE COURT t)V APPEALS 
I OK l l l l SI AII OF I TAII 
DARYL GENE CAAL'WE, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
vs. ) Case No. 92-6703705-CA 
KAYCAArWE, 
I'lainuil and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DARYL GENE CAAUWE 
JURISDICTION 
he Court y^\ Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
r<
"""** Ooes federal law preclude a state i••••\n- :\ -i ;r.-atint: "voluntary separation 
incentive pay" j'rom the armed forces pursuant tr- !<> ' '-' ' ' ' 75 as man-.:1 1\ subjtvt 
..L .::;,_; Drought by the former spouse? 
• • At 'ucstions oi lau are teC-v-ed ..nae:- a correcti« v. <>' crivr 
• lard, giving no deference to the trial court. Maxweu v. 
Issue; Are payments to defendant under the Voluntary Separation Incentive program 
nonmarital property acquired after \\w divonr? 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Maxwell 796 P.2d at 404. 
Issue: Did the Utah trial court have jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce 
entered in South Carolina? 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Maxwell 796 P. 2d at 404. 
Issue: Does the evidence support the trial court's findings that defendant has the 
ability to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees, and that plaintiff is in need of having her attorney's 
fees paid? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 
(UtahApp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from an order of the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable W. Brent West, granting plaintiffs petition to modify the decree 
of divorce. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February 1971, defendant/appellant Daryl Gene Caauwe O'Daryl") enlisted in the 
United States Air Force. Tr. at 25. He married Debra Kay Caauwe ("Debra"') on March 25, 
1972. Tr. at 3. In 1974, Daryl left the Air Force to attend college; he reenlisted in March 
1978. Tr. at 6. In 1982, the Caauwes moved to South Carolina when Daryl was stationed at 
Shaw Air Force Base. Id. 
In 1991, Debra filed for divorce in South Carolina; Daryl was still on active duty as a 
noncommissioned officer in the Air Force. Tr. at 6. Based on the parties' stipulation, the 
court entered a decree of divorce on September 10, 1991. R. at 131-149. The decree awarded 
Debra an interest in 50% of Daryl's net disposable retired or retainer pay, to be paid by the Air 
Force directly to Debra pursuant to the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act, 
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ecree incorporated the 
parties' stipulation that Daryi would not "pursue any course of action that would defeat the 
Spouses niiht T" ^eei* j a portion ul ine lull net iisposabk * : 
.Vienna*-; ,_
 any action by merger * : . . ..,. .i.emeni pension M> a> a 
e a nmitatu i: .;. & amount of the total net monthI> retirement or retainer pay in which 
the [defen^r1 \. .- • 7. 
».. v. *. ;. . ^ ra moved u> Minnesota with *hc parties' two children. Tr. at 3. 
i was transferred u Hill Air force BUM* a T Daryi remarried Tr. at 24. The parties 
} h sn the ;; < • Dungest daughter, 
u^ v. Luii^  . - utn - iivc \.ih- i -in. r:c parties agreed to modify' the divorce decree to 
award Dan I custody and child support for Tammy. Vr 'i* " * '• *^ According' aie 
- i.»- — • ^ iwilecting the change 
• n Iamm> > ining arrangement w at 27-2% A feu months later the parties agreed to 
modify the South Carolina decree again—Debra reiea^ • K . 
. „.ij \\ai\cu cin\ .iLirv. :i- aimuMiv i.i a\vhange. Uaiyi agreed to pay 
Debra $100 a month a \ 'ieu. ^ aoiuf ••. - hei share ol -he Laua!^  a "v s^ir^ Carolina 
house, re^a^ed Dehra f * > • • ! . - . 
c .n i ai « . .> .ateresi I. Uebia ^ pnaht-sharing pian wvin -er employe, R ai 2C>-M judge 
Memmott entered an order reflecting this agreement on August " °* H at ^2-"3. 
In Decern1* " 
f\i-.^ a. .. von- arn nidi * ^uj-i .t • :xulaiiuii.\ Neparateo ana reeene nothing, 
Instead, the \ir force • >und Darvl eligible v* 'h \ oh^-r;r- • - noil Incentive (VSI) 
rr^arar /'"' . ._ j tgress in 1 " ^  nart 
< . a program to reduce the size of the anned forces by providing financial incentives to 
c:v.ourage members, who otherwise would face selection for invol -^'* e 
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voluntarily. Under the VSI program, a member of the armed forces receives separation pay in 
annual installments for a period of time twice the length of his active duty service. The 
member must remain in a reserve component for the entire time. On December 31, 1992, 
Daryl was released from active duty and transferred to a reserve component. He received the 
first VSI installment on or about December 31, 1992. Since Daryl had more than seventeen 
years of creditable military service, he will receive annual payments of $9,473.17 for thirty-
five years. 
On December 11, 1992, Debra filed a petition to modify the divorce decree to award 
her 50% of the "early out" or incentive bonus Daryl received from the Air Force. An 
evidentiary hearing on the petition was held before the Honorable W. Brent West, Second 
Judicial District Court for Davis County, on April 23, 1993. On May 25, 1993, the court 
issued a written decision granting Debra's petition to modify the South Carolina divorce 
decree and ordering Daryl to pay Debra 50% of his annual net disposable VSI payments. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Federal law precludes a state court from treating VSI payments as marital property 
subject to equitable division. In the absence of express legislation to the contrary, the federal 
statutory scheme of providing for payments of benefits to military personnel preempts state 
laws pertaining to community property or equitable division of property upon divorce. 
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981); Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989). The 
Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, which expressly 
permits state courts to treat military retired pay as marital property, does not apply to 
separation pay under 10 U.S.C. § 1175. Therefore, the trial court lacked authority to order 
Daryl to pay Debra 50% of his VSI payments. 
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Further, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the South Carolina divorce decree 
to include Daryl's VSI payments as part of the marital estate. 
The trial court also erred in awarding Debra attorney fees when the court failed to 
make the requisite findings of financial need of the receiving party and ability of the other 
party to pay. 
ARGUMENT 
I. FEDERAL LAW PRECLUDES A STATE COURT FROM 
TREATING VSI PAYMENTS AS MARITAL PROPERTY 
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DIVISION 
In McCarty, 453 U.S. at 210, the Supreme Court held that the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution precluded a state trial court from dividing military retirement 
pay pursuant to California community property laws. Citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 
U.S. 572 (1979), the court employed a two-step analysis. First, the court found that the wife's 
asserted right to her husband's military pay conflicted with the express terms of federal law. 
The court concluded that the statutory language indicates that Congress intended that military 
retired pay be the personal entitlement of the retiree. Second, the court concluded that the 
application of community property laws would frustrate the objectives of the federal military 
retirement scheme: to serve as an inducement for enlistment and reenlistment, to create an 
orderly career path, and to ensure a youthful military by providing an incentive to retire. 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, recognized the plight of the ex-spouse of a 
military retiree, but stated Congress must decide whether to afford more protection to the 
former spouse of a retired service member: "[I]n no area has the Court accorded Congress 
greater deference than in the conduct and control of military affairs." Id. at 236. 
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As a direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in McCarty that federal law 
completely preempted the application of state community property law to military retirement 
pay, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act (USFSPA), 
10 U.S.C. § 1408 (Supp. 1993). The USFSPA has two basic parts: First the act authorizes 
state courts to treat military retirement pay as property divisible upon divorce of the retiree. 
10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (Supp. 1993) provides: "Subject to the limitations of this section, a 
court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member . . . either as property 
solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law 
of the jurisdiction of such court." Second, the USFSPA creates a mechanism for the federal 
government to make direct payments to former military spouses who present state court orders 
for payment of child support, alimony, or payments connected to the treatment of retired pay 
as marital property. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d) (Supp. 1993). 
The USFSPA applies to "retired pay"--pay received by a member of the armed forces 
upon retirement. In order to be eligible for retirement, a member must have a minimum of 
twenty years of creditable active service in the armed forces. A member who is involuntarily 
discharged with less than twenty years of active service is entitled to separation pay under 
10 U.S.C. § 1174 (Supp. 1993). The USFSPA does not apply to separation pay. Kuzmiak v. 
Kuzmiak* 222 Cal. Rptr. 664 (Cal. App. 1986) (the definition of "disposable retired pay" does 
not include separation pay). 
In Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, the only United States Supreme Court decision to apply the 
USFSPA, the court strictly construed the act to exclude military retirement pay waived by the 
retiree in order to receive veteran's disability benefits as property divisible upon divorce. The 
court found that the legislative history, as a whole, indicated that, while Congress intended to 
create new benefits for former spouses, it also intended to place limits on state courts designed 
to protect military retirees, and that to adopt the former spouse's view would "thwart the 
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obvious purposes of the Act." Id. at 594. Again, the court noted that, although it realized its 
decision might harm many former spouses where retirees elected to receive disability benefits 
in lieu of retirement pay, it was up to Congress to change the language of the statute. 
On December 5, 1991, Congress enacted temporary legislation designed to downsize 
the Armed Forces by providing personnel not yet eligible for retirement with a financial 
incentive to leave the armed forces. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. 102-190, §§ 661(a)(1) and 662(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1394-1396 (1991). 
(Codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1174a and 1175). R. at 64. The legislation implements a program 
containing two options for those who elect to separate voluntarily in order to avoid the 
possibility of selection for involuntary separation: Under the first option, the member 
receives a lump sum as separation pay, and under the second option, the member receives 
separation pay in the form of an annuity. The House conference report discusses the purpose 
of the legislation: 
The conferees take this action because of their concern over the effect 
of strength reductions during the next few years on our men and women in 
uniform and their families. The conferees especially recognize that this 
drawdown in strength is different from previous drawdowns because it affects 
people who are the product of an all volunteer force. Therefore, the conferees 
would provide these temporary authorities as tools to assist the military 
Services in selectively reducing, on a voluntary basis, that portion of the career 
personnel inventory that is not retirement eligible. The conferees believe that 
these authorities would give a reasonable, fair choice to personnel who would 
otherwise have no option but to face selection for involuntary separation, and 
to risk being separated at a point not of their own choosing. 
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-311, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1112. 
In a letter to all members of the armed forces regarding the new program, the Secretary 
of Defense, Dick Cheney, wrote: 
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We seek to accomplish the reduction in the size of the armed forces through 
means other than involuntary separation, to the maximum extent consistent 
with maintaining at all times a capable, ready force. We will reduce the 
number of personnel recruited into the armed forces, encourage early 
retirements of retirement-eligible personnel, and take other management 
measures. But even after we make effective use of these measures, we must 
still reduce the size of the armed forces by many thousands more people to 
achieve the planned, smaller force. We want to minimize involuntary 
separations in doing so. 
Consistent with the policy of avoiding involuntary separation, the Department 
of Defense has developed a program of financial incentives to encourage 
eligible military personnel to volunteer to leave the armed forces. 
R. at 64. 
The two types of financial incentives~the lump sum or SSB payments, and the annuity 
or VSI payments—have features in common with involuntary separation pay under § 1174. 
The amount of payment is based on the member's basic pay at time of separation, and on the 
member's years in service. The member is required to serve in the Ready Reserves. The main 
difference between "voluntary" separation pay under § 1174a and "involuntary" separation 
pay under § 1174 is the percentage applied to reach the amount of pay—"voluntary" separation 
pay is 15% of the product of the basic pay and the number of years, while "involuntary" 
separation pay is 10%. Under § 1175(e)(1), the member receives an annual payment for twice 
the number of years of service of the member. The member must remain in a reserve 
component for the entire length of time he or she receives the payments. The payment equals 
2.5% of the product of the basic pay and the years in service. Id. 
Neither §§ 1174a or 1175 mention the USFSPA or divisibility of the payments in the 
event of divorce. Mansell and McCarty make it clear that, in the absence of express federal 
legislation, a state court lacks the authority to treat separation pay as marital property. 
Congress's failure to provide for division of the payments in the event of divorce indicates that 
Congress intended that the payments be considered the separate property of the military 
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member. To treat the payments otherwise would frustrate the legislative objective of reducing 
the size of the military by avoiding involuntary separations. Accordingly, the trial court erred 
in this case in dividing the payments. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE SOUTH CAROLINA 
DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
The trial court never recited any basis for asserting subject matter jurisdiction to 
modify the South Carolina decree of divorce to include Daryl's VSI payments. Debra also 
never asserted basis for such jurisdiction. The South Carolina decree was simply filed in 
Davis County, without even being "domesticated" as required by UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-22a-l etseq. 
Debra styled the proceeding in which she sought to divide the VSI pay as a petition to 
modify. Daryl did not raise the issue of jurisdiction and the trial court indicated that it was 
enforcing the South Carolina decree, rather than modifying it. In fact, the court found that the 
full faith and credit clause prohibited modification of the decree to apply the Woodward1 
formula. However, it is clear that the trial court modified the South Carolina decree rather 
than enforcing it. The court awarded Debra 50% of something that did not exist at the time of 
the divorce. It did so without any authority. 
The fact that the parties consented to previous modifications of the South Carolina 
decree in Utah does not confer jurisdiction upon the court. Utah courts have repeatedly held 
that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court by consent or waiver and that 
a judgment can be attacked for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. E.g., Van Der 
Stappen v. Van Der Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah App. 1991); Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 
1172 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
1
 Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), established a formula for the division of retirement 
benefits, depending upon years of marriage and years of employment. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 1 HAT DARYL HAS THE 
ABILITY TO PAY DEBRA'S ATTORNEY'S FEES IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
A trial court must base its decision to award attorney's fees upon evidence of financial 
need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of 
the fees. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1992). 
Here, the trial court concluded that Daryl has the ability to pay Debra's attorney's fees 
based on its finding that Daryl is employed at Wal-Mart, earning a comparable wage to Debra 
($6.95 an hour), and that his wife is gainfully employed and enlisted with the Air Force. R. at 
168. However, the court failed to make any findings regarding Daryl's or his wife's expenses, 
nor is there any evidence in the record concerning Daryl's expenses. Thus, findings as to 
Daryl's income and expenses are insufficient to support a finding that he has the ability to pay 
attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal law precludes a state court from treating VSI payments as marital property 
subject to equitable division. In the absence of express legislation to the contrary, the federal 
statutory scheme of providing for payments of benefits to military personnel preempts state 
laws pertaining to community property or equitable division of property upon divorce. 
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210; Mansell, 490 U.S. 581. The Uniformed Services Former Spouse's 
Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, which expressly permits state courts to treat military retired 
pay as marital property, does not apply to separation pay under 10 U.S.C. § 1175. Therefore, 
the trial court lacked authority to order Daryl to pay Debra 50% of his annual net disposable 
VSI payments. 
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The trial court erred in awarding Debra attorney's fees because there is no evidence to 
support the requisite finding that Daryl has the ability to pay. The court failed to make any 
findings, nor is there any evidence in the record, regarding Daryl's expenses. A finding that 
Daryl is employed is inadequate to support a conclusion that Daryl has the ability to pay 
attorney's fees. 
Daryl respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of the trial 
court awarding Debra 50% of Daryl's military separation pay and ordering payment of Debra's 
attorney's fees. 
DATED this 10 day of November, 1993. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
By. 
ELLEN MAYCOCK 
Attorneys forDefendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT DARYL GENE CAAUWE to the following, postage prepaid, this 10th day 
of November, 1993: 
Robert L. Neeley, Esq. 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
1. Decision dated May 25, 1993 
2. Findings of Fact and Order on Plaintiffs Petition To Modify Decree of Divorce dated 
June 23, 1993, entered June 24, 1993 
13 
Tabl 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
Debra Kay Caauwe, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
Daryl Gene Caauwe, : 
Defendant. : 
: DECISION 
: Civil No. 926703705 
The issue is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to 50% 
of the Defendant's Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay from the 
military. 
Pursuant to the parties Divorce Decree, the Plaintiff 
was entitled to 50% of the Defendant's monthly retirement. After 
approximately 17 plus years, the Defendant voluntarily elected to 
forgo his retirement. He took advantage of the military's 
Voluntary Separation Incentive Program. The Plaintiff contends 
that the Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay program was taken, by 
the Defendant, in lieu of his military retirement benefits. As 
such, she claims a 50% interest in his Voluntary Separation 
Incentive Pay. 
On the other hand, the Defendant claims that his 
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay is separate and distinct from 
his military retirement benefits. He contends that the Voluntary 
Separation Incentive Pay program has a different purpose than 
Page Two 
Decision 
military retirement and should be treated differently. He 
further claims that the Voluntary Separation Incentive 
Pay is personal property acquired after the marriage. It is not 
marital property subject to distribution to the Plaintiff. 
The Court finds for the Plaintiff. The Divorce Decree 
is dispositive. Paragraph 4K of the decree states ... that the 
Defendant agrees not to merge the (Defendant's) retired or 
retainer pay with any other pension, and not to pursue any course 
of action that would defeat the (Plaintiff's) right to receive a 
portion of the full net disposable retired or retainer pay of 
the (Defendant) (emphasis added.) The (Defendant) further 
agrees not to take any action by merger of the military 
retirement pension so as to cause a limitation in the amount of 
the total net monthly retirement or retainer pay in which the 
(Defendant) has a vested interest, and, therefore, the 
(Defendant) will not cause a limitation of the (Plaintiff's) 
monthly payments as set forth above. The Divorce Decree further 
provides that if the Defendant breaches the agreement, he will 
indemnify the Plaintiff by making direct monthly payments to the 
Plaintiff in the amount provided in Paragraph 4C of the decree. 
Those payments are to be made under the same terms and conditions 
as if those payments were made pursuant to Paragraph 4C. 
Paragraph 4C of the decree gives the Plaintiff a 50% interest in 
the Defendant's net disposable retired or retainer pay. See 
Page Three 
Decision 
paragraph 4F of the Divorce Decree for a definition of "net 
disposable.") 
By taking advantage of the military's Voluntary 
Separation Incentive Pay program, the Defendant has attempted to 
eliminate entirely the Plaintiff's interest in his retirement 
benefits. Under the divorce decree, he agreed not to do that. 
He agreed not to pursue any course of action that would defeat or 
limit her interest in his military retirement. As such, he is 
required to pay her the equivalent of her 50% interest in his net 
disposable retirement pay. However, the Defendant did not earn a 
full retirement from the military. Instead, he substituted, in 
its place, the Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay program. Both 
programs are similar. They both use base salary and length of 
service to determine the amount of benefit. Since the Court 
can't determine from the evidence what 50% of the Defendant's net 
disposable retirement pay would be, the Plaintiff is awarded a 
50% interest in the Defendant's net disposable Voluntary 
Separation Incentive Pay. 
In addition, the Court is enforcing a South Carolina 
Divorce Decree. The decree states that the Plaintiff will 
receive a 50% share of the Defendant's full retirement. The 
decree makes no provision for application of the Woodward formula 
that might have been applicable had it been a Utah Divorce 
Decree. Full faith and credit requires enforcement of the South 
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Decision 
Carolina decree without modification under the Woodward Formula. 
Finally, the Plaintiff is awarded her costs and 
attorney's fees of $1,000.00 for having to bring this Petition to 
enforce the Divorce Decree. She has prevailed. The Defendant 
has the financial ability to pay Plaintiff's fees. The Plaintiff 
is in financial need of having her attorney's fees paid. The 
fees are reasonable. 
Plaintiff's attorney will please prepare Findings of 
Facts, Conclusions of Law and and Order consistent with this 
ruling. 
DATED this 2S^ day of May, 19 °& . 
Signed_ 
W. Brent West 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Decision to Robert L. Neeley, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, at 2485 Grant Avenue., Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
and to Brent E. Johns, Attorney for Defendant, at 2411 Kiesel 
Avenue, JSuite 101, Ogden, Utah 84401-2391, postage prepaid, date"* 
thiso^T^day of May, 199 f3 . 
Tab 2 
ROBERT L. NEELEY #237 3 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-3646 
Ju :u i j | us k>\ :33 
CLE: 
BY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA KAY CAAUWE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DARYL GENE CAAUWE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Judge: 
C i v i l No. 9 2 6 7 0 3 7 0 5 
VfinJ 
That hearing on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce, having come on regularly for hearing, before the Honorable 
W. Brent West, District Court Judge, on the 23rd day of April, 
1993. Plaintiff, Debra Kay Caauwe, was personally present and 
represented by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley; and defendant, Daryl 
Gene Caauwe, was personally present and represented by his 
attorney, Brent E. Johns. The plaintiff and defendant having been 
sworn and testified; and the Court having received exhibits from 
the respective parties; and being fully advised in the matter; 
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Order on 
Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce: 
1. That plaintiff obtained a Decree of Divorce from 
defendant on or about the 7th day of September, 1991, in the Family 
Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, County of Sumter, State of 
South Carolina. 
2. Pursuant to paragraph 4(c). of the Divorce Decree, 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 
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plaintiff was to receive 50% of defendant, Daryl Gene Caauwe's net 
disposable retire or retainer pay in connection with defendant's 
military retirement benefits acquired from the United States Air 
Force. 
3. That pursuant to paragraph 4(k) of the Decree of 
Divorce, defendant agreed not to merge the members retired or 
retainer pay with any other pension, and not to pursue any course 
of action that would defeat the spouses right to receive a portion 
of the full net disposable retired or retainer pay of the member. 
The member agreed not to take any action by merger of the military 
retirement pension so as to cause a limitation in the amount of the 
total net monthly retirement or retainer pay in which the member 
has a vested interest and, therefore, the member should not cause 
a limitation of the spouses monthly payments as set forth above. 
The member agreed to indemnify the spouse for any breach of this 
paragraph. 
4. The issue before the above-entitled Court is whether 
plaintiff, Debra Kay Caauwe, is entitled to 50% of Defendant's 
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay from the United States Air 
Force . 
5. Defendant took advantage of the United States Air 
Force's Voluntary Separation Incentive Program, and plaintiff 
contends that the Voluntary Incentive Program was taken, by the 
defendant, in lieu of his military retirement benefits, and as 
such, she claims a 50% interest in his Voluntary Separation 
Incentive Pay. The defendant claims that his Voluntary Separation 
Incentive Pay is separate and distinct from his military retirement 
benefits. Defendant contends the Voluntary Separation Incentive 
Pay Program has a different purpose and military retirement and 
should be treated differently. Defendant further claims that the 
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay is personal property acquired 
after the marriage and is not marital property subject to 
distribution to the plaintiff. 
6. The Court finds by taking advantage of the Military 
Voluntary Separation Incentive Program, the defendant has attempted 
to eliminate entirely the plaintiff's interest in his retirement 
benefits. Under the South Carolina Divorce Decree, defendant 
agreed not to do that. Defendant agreed not to pursue any course 
of action that would defeat or limit plaintiff's interest in 
defendant's military retirement. 
7. Under the Decree of Divorce, defendant is required to 
pay plaintiff the equivalent of plaintiff's 50% in his net 
disposable retirement pay. However, the defendant did not earn a 
full retirement from the United States Air Force. Instead, 
defendant substituted, in its place, the Voluntary Separation 
Incentive Pay Program. 
8. The Court finds both programs are similar. The Court 
finds that both programs use base salary and length of service to 
determine the amount of benefit. 
9. Under the Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay Program, 
the United States Air Force computed defendant's base pay of 
$1,779.00 and multiplied the same by 213 months as defendant was 
credited with serving 17 years and 9 months effective military 
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service and multiplied the same by 15% to arrive at a lump sum 
benefit payment of $56,839.05. The Court received this information 
based upon Stipulation of the parties pursuant to information 
provided by response to plaintiff's Subpoena Duces Tecum. 
10. Defendant however elected an annual annuity of 
$9,473.17 which was arrived at by the United States Air Force 
multiplying defendant's base pay of $1,779.00 X 213 months X 2.5% 
to arrive at an annual installment annuity of $9,473.17. 
11. Since the Court cannot determine exactly from the 
evidence what 50% of defendant's net disposable would be, the 
plaintiff is awarded a 50% interest in the defendant's net 
disposable voluntary separation pay. Defendant is ordered to pay 
plaintiff, Debra Kay Caauwe, 50% of the amount received on or about 
January, 1993, believed to be approximately $7,000.00 as per the 
testimony of defendant. Judgment is granted to plaintiff against 
defendant, Daryl Gene Caauwe, for the sum of $3,500.00 for 
plaintiff's share of defendant's initial payment. 
12. Hereafter, plaintiff is to receive 50% of the net 
annual annuity payment from each of the remaining 34 annual 
installment payments of $9,473.17. 
13. As the Court is enforcing its South Carolina Decree 
of Divorce which provides that plaintiff shall receive a 50% 
portion of defendant's full retirement, the Decree makes no 
provision for application of the Utah Woodward Formula that might 
have been applicable had it been a Utah Divorce Decree. 
14. Full faith and credit requires enforcement of the 
South Carolina Decree without modification under the Utah Woodward 
Formula. 
15. That plaintiff is awarded her cost and attorney fees 
of $1,000.00 for having to bring this Petition to enforce the 
Decree of Divorce, and accordingly, judgment is granted in favor of 
plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of $1,000.00. 
16. The Court finds that plaintiff is gainfully employed 
at Wal-Mart earning $6.95 per hour and averaging between 32 to 38 
hours per week with a net pay of approximately $373.00 each two 
weeks. 
17. The Court finds that defendant is likewise employed 
at Wal-Mart earning a comparable wage to plaintiff but in addition, 
has remarried and his wife is gainfully employed and enlisted with 
the United States Air Force. 
18. The Court finds that defendant has the financial 
ability to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees, that plaintiff is in 
financial need of having her attorney fees paid and the fees are 
reasonable and proper. 
dO 
DATED this I*- day of June, 1993. 
W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BRENT E. J#HNS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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